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NOTES 
Discovery of Retained Nontestifying Experts' Identities Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
A number of strategic considerations may induce a party to a 
lawsuit to retain an expert who will not be called as a trial witness to 
assist in the party's preparation for trial. I Because facts known and 
opinions held by these nontestifying experts may greatly facilitate 
trial preparation,2 the retaining party's opponent may attempt to dis-
cover this information. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), 
however, allows discovery of "facts known or opinions held" by re-
tained but nontestifying experts only after "a showing of exceptional 
circumstances. "3 
Whether rule 26(b)(4)(B) also limits discovery of the identity of 
such witnesses is an open question, the resolution of which must ac-
commodate two competing policies. On the one hand, ignorance of 
the identity of nontestifying experts may hamper a party's ability to 
demonstrate that "exceptional circumstances" justify discovery of 
the "facts known or opinions held" by those experts. On the other 
hand, knowledge of an expert's identity may enable a party to cir-
cumvent rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s limitations by seeking information di-
rectly from the expert rather than from the opposing party. The 
courts that have considered motions to compel discovery of the iden-
tities of nontestifying experts have struck different balances between 
these policies and have been unable to agree on a single standard 
against which to test requests for identification. Some courts have 
held that rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s "exceptional circumstances" test applies 
not only to information possessed by nontestifyin.g experts, but also 
to their identities.4 The majority view, however, is that parties seek-
I. Cf. Note, A Proposed Amendmenllo Rule 26(b){4){B): The Expert Twice Retained, 12 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 533, 546-47 (1979) (suggesting that "free agent" experts - those who had 
been retained by a party to a multi-party suit who has left the litigation - may be retained by 
another party "to educate the party in a general fashion concerning the merits of his case, . . .. 
to obtain information that can be used at trial against the opposing party [, and] . . . to obtain 
and conceal information that an opposing party could use at trial"). 
2. See Note, Civil Procedure- Discovery of Expert Information, 41 N.C. L. REV. 401, 406 
(1969). 
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
4. See Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th 
Cir. 1980); Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971). In Guilloz v. Fal-
mouth Hosp. Assn., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1367 (D. Mass. 1976), the court said that it preferred 
the Perry rule, but refused to allow discovery of a nontestifying expert's name on the ground 
that, in any event, it did not meet the relevance requirement of rule 26(b)(l). 21 Fed. R. Serv. 
2d at 1371. 
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ing discovery of the identities of their adversaries' retained nontesti-
fying experts need not demonstrate "exceptional circumstances."5 
Courts adopting this view have concluded that rule 26(b)(4)(B) does 
not render rule 26(b)(l)'s relevance standard inapplicable to simple 
requests for identification. 
The procedural and substantive differences between the two ap-
proaches are significant.6 If a party must satisfy only rule 26(b)(l), 
discovery will proceed routinely. An interrogatory requesting identi-
fication demands an answer or objection. If the party served with an 
interrogatory refuses to answer, the discovering party may seek an 
order compelling discovery.7 But if discovery of a nontestifying ex-
pert's identity is conditioned on a showing of "exceptional circum-
stances," the discovering party must always seek a court order, and 
the norm of extrajudicial discovery8 is reversed. More important 
than this procedural difference between the majority and minority 
views is the divergence of the applicable standards. Rule 26(b)(l)'s 
relevance standard is broad, while rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s "exceptional 
circumstances" test is narrow. Under the former standard, the iden-
tity of nontestifying experts will almost always be discoverable; 
under the latter standard, discovery will occur only rarely. 
This Note proposes an approach to the problem of identification 
of rule 26(b)(4)(B) experts that differs from both of the approaches 
taken in the reported opinions. 9 Part I analyzes the language of rule 
26(b) and rejects the majority approach. As a matter of statutory 
5. See Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Roesberg v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 
F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa, 
1978); Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Baki v. B.F. Dia-
mond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony, Inc. v, Continental Ins. Co., 63 
F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974). 
6. The difference of opinion has been noted by a number of commentators. See 4 
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE i 26.66(4) (2d ed. Supp. 1980-81) (endorsing majority view); C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2032, at 255 & n.81 (1970 & 
Supp. 1980) (apparently endorsing majority view); Graham, .Discovery of Experts Under Rule 
26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Par/ One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. 
L.F. 895, 933-34 [hereinafter cited as Graham I) (stating that issue may be of little consequence 
since a retained expert will refuse to speak voluntarily with an opponent). In a later article, 
however, Professor Graham argues in favor of the minority view. Graham, .Discovery of Ex-
perts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Jwo, an Empirical Study 
and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 201-02 [hereinafter cited as Graham II]. 
7. See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(a). 
8. See 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, i 26.02[5], at 26-72 ("discovery Rules 
[are] ... intended to operate on the initiative of the parties and, where possible, without court 
intervention"). 
9. The paucity of reported cases does not reflect the importance of the issue or frequency 
with which it arises. For example, one study reported that while from July 1960 to April 1964, 
there were only 348 cases involving discovery reported in the Federal Rules Decisions and the 
Federal Rules Service, it was estimated that the district courts in 1962 alone made over 8,000 
discovery decisions. See Note, Federal .Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 8 
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 623 n.3 (1972) (citing COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PROJECT FOR EF-
FECTIVE JUSTICE, FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRE• TRIAL DISCOVERY, lv-1 to -2). In addition 
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construction, rule 26(b )( 4)(B) governs the disclosure of the identity 
of nontestifying experts retained by a party in preparation for trial. 
Part II examines the underlying purposes of rules 26(b)(l) and 
26(b)(4)(B) - to ensure adequate pretrial disclosure and to prevent 
unfairness in adversarial competition - and suggests that both inter-
ests may be accommodated. These interests are appropriately bal-
anced by requiring a party to show "exceptional circumstances" to 
discover the name and address of a rule 26(b)(4)(B) expert, but al-
lowing routine discovery by interrogatory of such an expert's spe-
cialty or field of expertise and a brief description of the services that 
the expert performed in anticipation of litigation. 
I 
The standard governing the discoverability of the identity of 
nontestifying experts retained by a party in anticipation of litigation 
will be found in either rule 26(b)(l) or rule 26(b)(4)(B). Rule 
26(b )(1 ), the general scope-of-discovery provision, allows discovery 
of "any matter . . . relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, . . . including . . . the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." 10 Other provi-
sions of rule 26(b ), however, limit the discoverability of certain types 
of information. I I Although relevant, "facts known and opinions 
held by experts . . . acquired or developed in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial" may be discovered only if the moving party satisfies 
the requirements of rule 26(b)(4).I2 Under rule 26(b)(4)(B), "facts 
known or opinions held" by specially retained experts who are not 
expected to testify at trial are discoverable "only . . . upon a showing 
of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the 
party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same sub-
ject by other means."I3 
to the infrequency of reported opinions, many discovery disputes are never even brought to the 
attention of courts but rather are informally resolved by the parties themselves. 
Appellate review of discovery rulings is rare because they are not usually final orders and 
thus are not immediately appealable. While a discovery ruling can be reviewed on appeal 
from a later final order, by then the matter is usually moot. Occasionally, there is review from 
a sanction imposed under rule 37 - the procedure employed in the only reported court of 
appeals decision to date on the topic of this Note, Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training 
School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of appellate review of 
discovery orders, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2006. 
10. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l). Courts consider that the relevance requirement is met when-
ever there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter 
of the action. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, Sllpra note 6, § 2009, at 46-47, and cases cited 
therein. 
11. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26{b)(3) (limiting discoverability of attorney's work product); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A) (specifying scope of discovery from experts who are expected to testify 
at trial). 
12. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4). 
13. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Rule 26(b)(4) creates a complex scheme 
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The language of rules 26(b)(l) and 26(b)(4)(B) has given rise to 
two conflicting inferences. Reasoning that rule 26(b)(4)(B) only fun-
its the discoverability of "facts known or opinions held" by nontesti-
fying experts and not their identities, most courts find that rule 
26(b)(l) governs and order disclosure of experts' identities on a sim-
ple showing ofrelevance. 14 InAger v. Jane C Stormont Hospital and 
Training School for Nurses, 15 however, the Tenth Circuit rejected 
this approach and applied rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s "exceptional circum-
stances" standard to a request for disclosure of the names and loca-
tions ofnontestifying experts. TheAger court relied on the Advisory 
Committee Note to rule 26(b)(4){B), which states that "[a]s an ancil-
lary procedure, a party may on a proper showing require the other 
party to name experts retained or specially employed, but not those 
informally consulted."16 For policy reasons, the court held that a 
"proper showing" corresponds to a showing of "exceptional circum-
regarding expert discovery. The rule contains three subdivisions: subdivision A, addressing 
experts expected to testify as expert witnesses at trial, subdivision B, addressing retained non-
testifying experts, and subdivision C, concerning payment of fees. Under rule 26(b)(4)(A), a 
party may through interrogatories require his adversary to identify each expert that the adver-
sary expects to call at trial and to describe the substance of and the grounds for the expert's 
expected testimony. Further discovery by other means, such as deposition of the expert or 
production of documents prepared by the expert, may be had only on motion and court order. 
Under rule 26(b)(4)(C), if the court does order further discovery, it shall require the discover-
ing party to pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery, and may 
require the discovering party to pay the retaining party a fair portion of the fee incurred by the 
latter in hiring the expert. 
In contrast to rule 26(b )( 4)(A), which allows limited discovery as of right regarding testify-
ing experts, rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects the information possessed by retained nontestifying ex-
perts in the absence of a special showing. 
Rule 26(b )( 4) directly addresses only testifying and retained nontestifying experts, but it 
also covers two additional categories of experts. The first is experts whom a party has infor-
mally consulted in preparation for trial but has not retained or specially employed. Courts 
agree that neither the identities of these persons nor their information is subject to discovery. 
See, e.g., Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Advisory Committee Note, 48 
F.R.D. 487, 504 (1969). The second category consists of experts whose information was not 
acquired in preparation for trial. These experts are outside the scope of rule 26(b )( 4) since the 
introductory language of the rule limits its coverage to expert information "acquired or devel-
oped in anticipation of litigation or for trial." FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4). As a result, routine 
discovery may be had regarding information possessed by an expert that was not acquired in 
preparation for trial. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2033. Examples of experts 
who are outside the scope of rule 26(b)(4) are (I) the expert who is regularly employed by a 
party and not specially employed on the case, 48 F.R.D. at 504, and (2) the expert who has 
information acquired as an actor or viewer with respect to the transactions that form the basis 
of the lawsuit, 48 F.R.D. at 503. 
14. See, e.g., Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976): 
This provision of Rule 26(b)(I) is not by its terms limited to the identity and location of 
non-experts but, on the contrary, expressly allows such information to be obtained as to 
any "persons having knowledge" of discoverable matter. Such a broad umbrella encom-
passes the category of[retained nontestifying experts] ... since they may have knowledge 
of matter discoverable or potentially discoverable under the provisions . • . of Rule 
26(b)(4)(B). 
71 F.R.D. at 181-82. , 
15. 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980). 
16. Advisory Committee Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504 (1969) (emphasis added). 
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stances" under rule 26(b)(4)(B).17 
The majority approach finds considerable support in rule 26(b ). 
Rule 26(b)(l) permits discovery of the identity of persons possessing 
discoverable information, and rule 26(b )( 4) does not, on its face, re-
move the identities of nontestifying experts from the scope of the 
general discovery provision. In contrast to rule 26(b)(4)(A), which 
requires a "party . . . to identify each person whom the . . . party 
expects to call as an expert witness at trial upon request by interro-
gatory," 18 rule 26(b)(4)(B) makes no reference to an expert's identity. 
This omission may mean that the drafters of rule 26(b)(4) intended 
to apply rule 26(b)(l)'s relevance standard to requests for identifica-
tion of nontestifying experts retained by a party in anticipation of 
litigation. 
Closer examination, however, reveals several defects in this anal-
ysis. First, the omission of any reference to identity in rule 
26(b)(4)(B) may actually support the minority position. Rule 
26(b )( 4) establishes a general rule barring discovery of "facts known 
and opinions held by experts," and then carves out limited excep-
tions for testifying and nontestifying experts. That the drafters 
thought it necessary to except the identities of testifying experts from 
rule 26(b)(4)'s general prohibition may suggest that the rule's scope 
is broader than a casual reading would suggest. By expressly man-
dating the disclosure of the identities of testifying experts only, the 
drafters, by implication at least, have hinted that the identity of non-
testifying experts need not be revealed. Under the majority ap-
proach, the identities of both testifying and nontestifying experts are 
routinely discoverable, and the distinction in treatment suggested by 
the different language of rules 26(b)(4)(A) and 26(b)(4)(B) is 
eliminated. 
Second, when read in conjunction with rule 26(b )(1 ), rule 
26(b)(4)(B)'s restrictions on discovery of information from nontesti-
fying experts extend to the identities of such experts as well. Rule 
26(b)(l) requires only that a party identify "persons having knowl-
edge of any discoverable matter."19 Rule 26(b)(4)(B) permits discov-
ery of "facts known or opinions held" by nontestifying experts only 
under "exceptional circumstances," in effect removing these experts, 
in all but rare cases,20 from the class of persons possessing discovera-
17. 622 F.2d at 503. 
18. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) (emphasis added). 
20. As one treatise st~tes: "[The exceptional-circumstances] formulation contemplates that 
in most cases discovery will not be permitted of information held by specially retained experts 
who are not to be called at trial." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2032, at 256 
(footnote omitted). An example of exceptional circumstances is where an expert has examined 
or runs tests on an item that is now altered or destroyed. See cases cited in C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, supra note 6, § 2032, at 256 n.87. In such a case, it is not merely "impracticable," the 
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ble information. Rule 26(b)(l)'s command, therefore, does not apply 
to retained but nontestifying experts. That rule 26(b)(l)'s identifica-
tion requirement is intended to apply to eyewitnesses to the occur-
rences giving rise to a lawsuit rather than to specially retained 
experts is further evinced by an examination of the purposes of the 
disclosure requirement. As Professors Wright and Miller explain, 
"The thought is that when a party has ... [discovered] who the wit-
nesses are and where they may be found, that he can then interview 
the witnesses, take their depositions, or otherwise find out what in-
formation they may have."21 Disclosing the names and locations of 
retained but nontestifying experts would, in most cases, serve no le-
gitimate purpose since a party must demonstrate "exceptional cir-
cumstances" before discovering information possessed by such 
experts. Even if "exceptional circumstances" exist, discovery of 
"facts known or opinions held" may be ordered to proceed through 
interrogatories, a process that makes irrelevant the locations of rule 
26(b )( 4)(B) experts. 22 
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 26(b)(4) also suggests that 
rule 26(b)(l)'s relevance standard applies only to occurrence wit-
nesses and not to experts. It removes from the scope of rule 26(b)(4) 
any expert witness who acquired information for trial "because he 
was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences 
that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit. Such an expert 
should be treated as an ordinary witness."23 The Committee Note, 
which illustrates that the drafters knew how to exempt certain ex-
perts, does not explicitly remove the identities of retained but non-
testifying experts from the scope of rule 26(b )( 4). 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against the majority ap-
proach can be found in the Advisory Committee's indication that the 
phrase used in rule 26(b)(4)(B), but impossible for the adversary to obtain facts or opinions on 
the same subject by other means. 
Professor Albert Sacks, reporter to the committee, listed two [examples of exceptional] 
circumstances at a Practicing Law Institute Seminar on Discovery Sept. 25-26, 1970, in 
Atlanta. His description of the circumstances can be paraphrased as follows: 
(a) Circumstances in which an expert employed by the party seeking discovery could 
not conduct important experiments and test(s] because an item of equipment, etc., 
needed for the test(s] has been destroyed or is otherwise no longer available. If the 
party from whom discovery is sought had been able to have its experts test the item 
before its destruction or nonavailability, then information obtained from those tests 
might be discoverable. 
(b) Circumstances in which it might be impossible for a party to obtain its own expert. 
Such circumstances would occur when the number of experts in a field is small and 
their time is already fully retained by others. 
See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS & ALI-ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINU-
ING LEGAL EDUCATION, CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 189 (1974), quoted in Ager v. Jane C. Stormont 
Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 503 n.8 (10th Cir. 1980). 
21. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2013, at 102-03 (footnote omilled). 
22. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not specify the proper method of discovery, in contrast to rule 
26(b)(4)(A), which prescribes interrogatories or other means pursuant to court order. 
23. Advisory Committee Note, 48 F.R.D. 487,503 (1969). 
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identities of retained but nontestifying experts may be discovered 
"on a proper showing."24 Since a party may have to make some 
showing under both the majority and minority approaches, the 
phrase is somewhat ambiguous. Although "proper showing" argua-
bly could refer to a mere showing of relevance, several factors sug-
gest that the Ager court's equation of "proper showing" with 
"exceptional circumstances"25 more nearly captures the drafters' in-
tent. First, as indicated by its introductory language, rule 26(b )( 4) 
assumes that the relevance standard has been satisfi.ed.26 Its subsec-
tions impose requirements that supplement the minimums of rule 
26(b )(1 ). Logic suggests, therefore, that a statement by the Advisory 
Committee explicating those additional requirements in a note to 
rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not refer merely to the showing of relevance 
that rule 26(b )( 4) assumes has already been made. The Advisory 
Committee's use of the word "showing," moreover, is instructive 
since the word appears only in the language of rule 26(b)(4)(B) and 
not in rule 26(b)(l). This, combined with the facts that rule 26(b)(l) 
ordinarily requires no showing by a party seeking discovery while 
rule 26(b)(4)(B) always requires parties to convince the court that 
disclosure is appropriate, suggests that the intended referent of 
"proper showing" is rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s "exceptional circumstances" 
test. 
Finally, the majority approach overlooks the inferences that can 
be drawn from the dates of enactment of rules 26(b )(1) and 
26(b)(4)(B). The pertinent language of rule 26(b)(l) has been part of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since their initial enactment in 
1938.27 Until the 1970 amendments, which included the current rule 
26(b)(4), the Federal Rules did not contain any provision regarding 
expert discovery,28 and many courts allowed no discovery of experts' 
information.29 From an historical perspective, therefore, rule 
26(b)(l) could not have been intended to address the discoverability 
of rule 26(b)(4)(B) experts' identities. There is no evidence that in 
drafting the 1970 amendments, the Advisory Committee intended to 
apply the already existing standard established by rule 26(b )(1) for 
24. 48 F.R.D. at 504. 
25. See note 17 supra. 
26. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(4) ("otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision 
(b)(l) of this rule"). 
27. The original rule 26(b) governed the scope of discovery by deposition and allowed a 
party to discover "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." 1 
F.R.D. xcvii (1941). The rules dealing with discovery by means other than deposition incorpo• 
rated by reference rule 26(b)'s scope provision. The 1970 amendments effected a major reor-
ganization of the discovery rules: rule 26(b) was made a general provision governing the scope 
of discovery by any means rather than by deposition alone. 
28. See generally 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, ~ 26.66, at 26-463 to 485; 
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, §§ 2029-2035, at 240-67. 
29. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2029, at 240-49. 
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occurrence witnesses to the discovery of the identities of retained but 
nontestifying experts.30 
Thus, what little evidence exists in the language of rule 26(b) and 
in the Advisory Committee Note suggests that the majority's liberal 
approach to the discoverability of the identities of nontestifying ex-
perts is incorrect. Although statutory interpretation, particularly on 
so scant a record, is admittedly an imprecise endeavor, the evidence 
strongly favors theAger court's more restrictive approach. That ap-
proach, with one modification suggested in Part II, also strikes an 
appropriate balance between the goals of ensuring adequate pretrial 
disclosure and preventing unfairness in adversarial competition. 
II 
The question whether the identities of retained but nontestifying 
experts should be routinely disclosed under rule 26(b)(l) or sub-
jected to rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s more stringent requirements implicates 
two fundamental discovery policies. Rule 26(b)(l)'s liberal rele-
vance standard ensures full and open pretrial disclosure - the pri-
mary goal of the discovery process. 31 But the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure also seek to prevent unfairness in adversarial competi-
tion.32 Disclosure of information known or opinions held by experts 
allows the discovering parties to derive unfair benefits from their ad-
versaries' better preparation,33 thus rewarding laziness and deterring 
30. Indeed, according to Judge Charles W. Joiner, a member of the committee that drafted 
rule 26(b )( 4), the drafters did not intend to apply the already existing language of rule 26(b )(I) 
to identification of rule 26(b)(4)(B) experts. Letter from Judge Charles W. Joiner to Michigan 
Law Review Association (Nov. 4, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
31. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 3S6 U.S. 677, 682 (19S8) (purpose of the 
discovery rules is to "make a trial less a game of blindman's buff and more a fair contest with 
the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent"); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 49S, 501 (1947) (with advent of new discovery rules, no longer are civil trials "to be 
carried on in the dark"); 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, ~ 26.02, at 26-62 to 68; 
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2001, at 13-20. 
32. See Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 51S F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975); Grinnell Corp. v. 
Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I. 1976); Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. 
Supp. I 122 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
60 F.R.D. 20S (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
33. See Advisory Committee Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, S04 (1969). The unfairness doctrine 
was developed by courts as a limit on expert discovery prior to the 1970 adoption of rule 
26(b)(4), when the Federal Rules contained no provision regarding discovery of experts. See, 
e.g., United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, More or Less, 32 F.R.D. S93, 597 (D. Md. 1963). As 
originally conceived, the unfairness doctrine was concerned with protecting a party's "property 
right" in the expert's testimony. See, e.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. 
Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940). Since rule 26(b)(4)(C) provides for payment of fees in proper 
cases, see note 13 supra, this is no longer of concern. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 
6, § 2034, at 2S9-60. 
Prior to the 1970 adoption of rule 26(b)(4), courts also denied discovery on the grounds of 
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 
23 F.R.D. 680, 68S-86 (D.R.I. 19S9), and the work product doctrine, see, e.g., United States v. 
McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1967). In the years before rule 26(b)(4) was adopted, 
however, two influential law review articles thoroughly debunked the notion that the know!-
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diligence in trial preparations. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) strikes a conserva-
tive balance between ensuring adequate disclosure and preventing 
unf aimess because it permits discovery only under "exceptional 
circumstances." 
According to the Advisory Committee, rule 26(b )( 4) mediates be-
tween these basic policies by distinguishing between testifying and 
nontestifying experts.34 The need for disclosure is paramount in the 
case of testifying experts because effective cross-examination of ex-
perts at trial requires advance knowledge of their testimony. Rule 
26(b)(4)(A) thus provides for limited discovery concerning the iden-
tity and testimony of such experts. But disclosure of facts known 
and opinions held by nontestifying experts is rarely necessary be-
cause there will be no cross-examination and the opponent can usu-
ally obtain the information possessed by the expert from other 
sources. Rule 26(b)(4)(B), therefore, minimizes unfairness and en-
courages the retention of nontestifying experts by restricting access 
to their information and opinions in the absence of "exceptional 
circumstances." 
Routine disclosure of the identities of nontestifying experts up-
sets the drafters' intended balance. Parties who obtain a rule 
26(b)(4)(B) expert's identity can circumvent the discovery process by 
contacting the expert directly in an e.ff ort to induce informal disclo-
sure. In this way, parties may gain access to information otherwise 
available only under "exceptional•circumstances." Several undesir-
able consequences may follow. Informal disclosure allows parties to 
take unfair advantage of the time and expense that their adversaries 
have spent :finding experts and familiarizing them with the case.35 In 
edge of an expert is protected by either the attorney-client or the work product privilege. See 
Friedenthal, J)iscove,y and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455 
(1962); Long, J)iscove,y and Experts, Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L. 
REV. 665 (1964). Accordingly, the drafters of rule 26(b)(4) co=ented as follows: 
These new provisions of subdivision (b)(4) repudiate the few decisions that have held an 
expert's information privileged simply because of his status as expert . . . . They also 
reJect as ill-considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within 
the work-product doctrine .... The provisions adopt a form of the more recently devel-
oped doctrine of "unfairness." 
48 F.R.D. at 504-05 (citations omitted). 
34. 48 F.R.D. at 504. For an analysis of the rationale behind the distinction between testi-
, fying and nontestifying experts, see Note, Proposed I967 Amendments to the Federal J)iscove,y 
Rules, 68 CoLUM. L. REV. 271, 282 (1968). 
35. Professor Graham co=ents as follows regarding the unfairness of informal contact 
between a retained nontestifying expert and an opponent: 
Various considerations support the belief that a party should be free to consult an expert 
without any fear of the expert subsequently disclosing information to an opponent. A 
party obviously hopes that the time, money, and effort expended to locate and prepare an 
expert will not result in valuable expert assistance for an opponent. Moreover, in the 
process of consulting the expert, a person may disclose facts and discuss litigation strategy 
as part of the team preparation for trial. Any disclosure of such information to an oppo-
nent would be extremely damaging . . . . [R]ules of procedure governing the discovery 
of expert witnesses must protect a party from an expert witness previously consulted walk-
ing into the opponent's arms. 
522 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:513 
addition, the possibility of informal disclosure may deter litigants 
from seeking out and retaining experts. Finally, disclosure of the 
identity of certain types of experts may make them reluctant to con-
sult with litigants in the future. The Ager court, for example, noted 
the "widespread aversion" of health care professionals to assist 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions, and argued that disclosure 
of the expert's identity would exacerbate this reluctance.36 
Despite these policies favoring secrecy, identification may be nec-
essary to enable parties to obtain further discovery to which they are 
entitled. Some sort of identification is necessary to alert a party to 
the existence of information - the expert's facts and opinions -
that may be discoverable under "exceptional circumstances." Such 
circumstances exist when it is impracticable for the discovering party 
to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. "Ex-
ceptional circumstances" arise, for example, where a party's expert 
has run tests on an item that has since been altered or destroyed.37 
Without knowing what type of expert an adversary has retained and 
the type of services that the expert performed on the destroyed ob-
ject, a party may be unable to make the required showing.38 
For this reason, parties have a legitimate need for disclosure of 
identifying information that is necessary to demonstrate the exist-
ence of "exceptional circumstances." This includes information con-
cerning the type of expert that an adversary has retained and the type 
of services that the expert has performed. An interrogatory request-
ing information essential to the proof of "exceptional circumstances" 
would ask: 
Graham II, supra note 6, at 194-95. 
Professor Graham conducted an empirical study of expert discovery in federal courts and 
concluded that "[s]eeking ... informal discovery of non-testifying experts whose names have 
been disclosed has become a significant practice in a minority of courts." Id. at 202. 
In Ager, the Tenth Circuit considered the danger of informal contact to be a policy reason 
that favored requiring a party to show exceptional circumstances to discover a rule 26(b)(4)(B) 
expert's identity. 622 F.2d at 503. 
36. 622 F.2d at 503. 
31. See note 20 supra. 
38. Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971), offers a good example of 
how a party needs to know some identifying information in order to show exceptional circum-
stances. In Perry, a volunteer fireman sued for injuries allegedly sustained when he was struck 
by a fire truck after trying to activate a pump manufactured and installed on the truck by the 
defendant. During the defendant's deposition of an employee of the fire department's work-
men's compensation carrier, the plaintiff's counsel refused to allow the employee to disclose 
the identities of "certain [retained nontestifying] experts who examined the truck and pump 
shortly after the accident." 54 F.R.D. at 279. When the defendant moved to compel the plain-
tiff to identify the experts, the court refused to order the disclosure because, in its view, the fact 
that the experts had examined the fire truck "well before the co=encement of the present 
action" did not prove the existence of exceptional circumstances. 54 F.R.D. at 280. But know-
ing the type of experts involved as well as the nature of their examination of the truck might 
have helped the defendant to show exceptional circumstances. If their examination altered the 
condition of the truck and pump, then exceptional circumstances clearly existed. See note 20 
supra. 
January 1982] Note - .Discovery of Nontest!fying Experts 523 
(1) Have you retained or specially employed any experts in an-
ticipation of litigation whom you do not expect to call at trial? 
(2) If yes, please describe the types of experts retained (i e. , 
their fields of expertise) and the nature of the services that they per-
formed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial. 
Although interrogatories seeking this information serve a legiti-
mate purpose, parties typically request more information. In partic-
ular, their interrogatories almost always ask their opponents to 
provide the names and addresses of all experts retained or specially 
employed.39 This additional information is not necessary to enable a 
party to demonstrate the existence of "exceptional circumstances." 
Retained experts may refuse to discuss the cases that they are work-
ing on with opponents of their employers,40 but courts should not 
create the danger of one party obtaining access to the information 
known and opinions held by an opponent's retained but nontestify-
ing expert by requiring the retaining party to disclose the expert's 
name and address. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts that have considered the discoverability of the identities 
of retained but nontestifying experts have not attempted to distin-
guish among the various components of these experts' "identities." 
This Note has suggested, however, that courts making such a distinc-
tion can achieve an appropriate balance of disclosure and fairness. 
To prevent unfairness in adversarial competition, courts should per-
mit discovery of retained but nontestifying experts' names and ad-
dresses only if the discovering party demonstrates "exceptional 
circumstances." But to ensure that a discovering party's ability to 
show that such circumstances exist is not impeded, courts should al-
low routine discovery of retained experts' areas o( expertise and the 
nature of the services that they performed. 
39. See, e.g., Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Md. 1976). 
40. See Graham I, supra note 6, at 933. 
